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Abstract 
This project is an overview of the emergency management discipline in protecting American 
schools through describing classroom active shooters, determining shared characteristics and 
indicators, and previous suggestions to improve the safety of the learning environment. Several 
sources were used to determine the best methods to mitigate this threat, including official after-
action reports from past occurrences, psychological examinations of perpetrating individuals, and 
numerous federal agencies, such as the Department of Justice and the U.S. Secret Service. The 
methodology to reach suggestions for mitigation entailed qualitative analysis of numerous after-
action reports to highlight mitigative efforts of threat assessment before the event and through 
which means. This methodology provided for the discussion of mitigative options for school 
administration, law enforcement, and emergency management and planning agencies. In 
addition, this project offers areas of future opportunity for research after mitigative strategies are 
explored to enhance and improve the safety and security in the classroom. 
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Active Shooter in the Classroom: A Case Study of Past Events 
and Future Mitigative Strategies 
 Violence in American schools is an unfortunate experience for the school community. 
One of the most destructive forms of violence in schools stems from active shooters. Countless 
incidents in educational facilities has led to the tragic deaths of thousands of students and faculty 
and wounded many more. This report is intended to address these significant incidents and their 
impact on the learning experience. With this, a research question arises in how to prevent these 
shootings: how can policies and response procedures be improved to mitigate against future 
incidents in American schools? To understand what can be done to mitigate against this threat, it 
is essential to know the definition of an active shooter and the statistics behind such incidents. 
An active shooter definition is explained in the following section. 
Active Shooter 
 Defining an active shooter has been a challenging task for scholars and practitioners. 
Each event has differing characteristics and outcomes making one, overarching definition 
difficult to achieve. Several federal agencies, including the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security and the U.S. Department of Justice, define an active shooter as “an individual actively 
engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area” (FBI, 2013, pg. 
5). This definition serves as a general and encompassing method to apply in reviewing statistics. 
Between 2000 and 2018, the FBI tracked and identified 277 instances of an active shooting in the 
United States (FBI, 2019). In these incidents, there has been a total of 2,430 casualties, including 
884 killed and 1,546 wounded (FBI, 2019). Almost all perpetrating individuals were male, with 
only 12 females out of 282 total individuals involved in active shootings (FBI, 2019). These 
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statistics highlight the troubling nature of active shootings in the United States. In knowing these 
statistics, it is important to understand the relevance in the school environment. 
Occurrences in Educational Facilities 
 Shootings in educational facilities are unfortunately included in the statistics discussed 
previously. The FBI identified 57 occurrences in schools to be considered an active shooting 
between 2000 and 2018 (FBI, 2019). Of these 57, most incidents occurred in a high school 
setting at 24, followed by institutes of higher education at 15 (FBI, 2019). Casualties in these 
incidents totaled 391, with 171 killed and 220 wounded (FBI, 2019). Most individuals involved 
in these shootings were male, aged in their teens and 20s (FBI, 2019). These statistics point to 
some general conclusions about where active shootings occur in educational facilities: most 
happen in high school facilities and carried out by males in their teens and 20s. The frequency of 
these incidents and their deadly impact on the educational environment must be addressed to 
ensure the safety of students and faculty. To do this, the phases of emergency management must 
be explained to combat these events. 
Phases of Emergency Management 
 Understanding the phases of emergency management is essential to addressing gun 
violence and active shootings in educational facilities. The four established phases are 
preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation (Lindsay, 2012). Figure 1 below depicts the 
proper flow of these phases. Preparedness describes the steps taken to “enhance the capacity to 
respond to an incident” that help personnel to be more effective and capable of handling the 
emergency (Lindsay, 2012, pg. 3). Response portrays the “immediate actions to save lives, 
protect property… and meet basic human needs” which includes activating emergency plans, 
facilitating evacuations, and deploying personnel to the incident (Lindsay, 2012, pg. 3). 
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Recovery follows the response phase and includes actions that “restore essential services and 
repair damages,” such as reestablishing government services and housing for displaced 
individuals (Lindsay, 2012, pgs. 3-4). Mitigation refers to actions prior to or after an incident that 
highlight “risks and hazards to either substantially reduce or eliminate the impact of an incident” 
(Lindsay, 2012, pg. 3). For the purpose of this report, mitigation will be the main phase of 
emergency management explored and discussed. Mitigation is the central focus of deterring and 
preventing school violence and active shootings. To ensure mitigative strategies are effective in 
this prevention, several characteristics of perpetrating individuals will be discussed next. 
Figure 1 
        (Boston University, 2020) 
Characteristics of the Perpetrators 
In understanding what an active shooting is and who follows through with these acts, it is 
important to explore commonalities in characteristics, attributes, and behaviors of these 
individuals. Active shooting perpetrators have been studied and classified as a result of several 
past occurrences. As such, knowing these characteristics can be used to help mitigate against 
these situations in the future. Underlying characteristics and behaviors must be studied to create 
an all-encompassing picture of the school shooter. There are many characteristics, indicators, and 
ACTIVE SHOOTER PAST EVENTS AND MITIGATION 6 
influences that combine to create an active shooter, such as gender, race, and age, social issues, 
homelife, planning and motives, behavioral issues, and mental health. For this research, gang 
violence, domestic violence, and spontaneous, non-premeditated violence are not considered. 
Gender, race and age will now be discussed. 
Gender 
Numerous sources convene and agree on the gender identification of perpetrators. It is 
generally accepted that most individuals are male (NTAC, 2019; Flores de Apodaca, Brighton, 
Perkins, Jackson, & Steege, 2012; Gerard, Whitfield, Porter, & Browne, 2016; Langman, 2016; 
Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018). In the FBI’s 2000-2013 study on all types of active shooter pre-
attack behaviors, 94% of incidents involved one or more male perpetrators (Silver, Simons, & 
Craun, 2018). More specifically, in a study performed by the United States Secret Service on K-
12 educational facility active shootings between 2008 and 2017, 83% of occurrences involved 
one or more male perpetrators (NTAC, 2019). Occurrences of female perpetrators pales in 
comparison to male perpetrators. One reason identified for this vast difference in gender is a 
male’s propensity towards violence (Flores de Apodaca et al., 2012). According to Flores de 
Apodaca et al., school-age males are six times more likely to be arrested for violent acts than 
females (2012). Other reasons, not based on gender, are discussed in later sections. Gender 
correlates with race, as described next. 
Race 
Historically, cases of active shootings have been dominated by Caucasian males 
(Steinkoler, 2017; Gerard et al., 2016; Flores de Apodaca et al., 2012; Langman, 2016; Silver, 
Simons, & Craun, 2018; NTAC, 2019). While this is generally the case, in more recent times, 
other ethnicities have increased in frequency for these events. These ethnicities, which have 
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witnessed specific increases, include black/African American, Hispanic/Latino, and Asian 
American (NTAC, 2019; Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018; Langman, 2016). In the case of overall 
recent occurrences in America, from 2000-2017, black/African American accounted for 15-16%, 
Hispanic/Latino for 5-6%, and Asian American for 10% (NTAC, 2019 Silver, Simons, & Craun, 
2018). Interestingly, one study found that this increase in other racial involvement was more 
common in specific populations in education. Most incidents at educational facilities involving 
non-Caucasian individuals were institutes of higher education, or universities and colleges 
(Langman, 2016). As with gender and race, age is also a major factor, outlined below. 
Age 
Age is an important characteristic of active shooting perpetrators. Statistically, 
perpetrators against educational facilities are between the ages of 12-21, with a mean age of 16 
(NTAC, 2019; Steinkoler, 2017; Flores de Apodaca et al., 2012). The grade level achieved by 
these individuals varies. In the study by the Secret Service, many of the perpetrators were in 
grades 9-11, showing high-school aged individuals to be most likely to carry out violence at 
school (NTAC, 2019). The lowest grade level witnessed was 7, with the highest level being some 
college (NTAC, 2019; Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018). Maturity level is another variation of age 
important to analyze. As Gerard et al. states, age should be analyzed because “it relates to social 
dynamics and the interactive context in which the offender is based” (2016, pg. 25). Put simply, 
the maturity level of the perpetrator impacts the overall outcome of the incident. Langman and 
Gerard et al. discuss the suicide rates of perpetrators during active shooting events. Both studies 
conclude that adult individuals, described as over the age of 18, are more likely to commit 
suicide rather than be apprehended by law enforcement (Langman, 2016; Gerard et al., 2016). In 
addition, adult perpetrators have higher victim rates when compared to juveniles, aged 12-18. 
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Adult perpetrators average 11.8 victims while juveniles average 7.7 victims in these events 
(Langman, 2016). With these characteristics, it is important to understand social issues impacting 
these perpetrators, analyzed in the next section. 
Social Issues 
Social issues are central to the characterization of perpetrators. Many of these individuals 
are victims of bullying, teasing, and victimization prior to performing acts of violence in 
educational facilities, with 100% of K-12 perpetrators experiencing a social stressor (NTAC, 
2019; Gerard et al., 2016; Steinkoler, 2017; Flores de Apodaca et al., 2012). In addition, these 
individuals have characteristics of isolation and hardship integrating into the social nature of 
American school systems. These include suffering making new friends, are considered unpopular 
or loners by peers, and have experiences with rejection by peers (Gerard et al., 2016; Steinkoler, 
2017). In about half of cases noted in the study by Gerard et al., peers directly linked to the 
bullying and victimization of the perpetrator before the shooting became the targeted victims and 
casualties (Gerard et al., 2016). In addition, Gerard et al. highlights that 80% of perpetrating 
individuals were victims of bullying, teasing, and ostracization (2016). Among the types of 
bullying of K-12 attackers, 74% experienced verbal bullying, and 40% experienced physical 
bullying (NTAC, 2019). From this population, 89% of perpetrators performed poorly in 
academics prior to the incidents (NTAC, 2019). Social issues tie into the homelife of the 
perpetrator, discussed now. 
Homelife 
Experiences at home and with family members affect perpetrators in many ways. 
According to the Secret Service, 91% of individuals experienced a stressor directly linked to 
family and homelife prior to the attack (NTAC, 2019). Issues with family life include parental 
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abuse or neglect, lack of supervision, lack of intimacy or closeness to family members, a 
dominant parental figure, and frequency in moving houses (NTAC, 2019; Gerard et al., 2016; 
Steinkoler, 2017). With this, it is important to understand two specific characterizations under 
homelife with direct ties to the perpetrator: parental factors and the inclusion of firearms in daily 
life. In the Secret Service study, 71% of individuals experienced parental separation or divorce 
and 69% with financial struggles (NTAC, 2019). Single-parent households, either from 
separation or divorce, have also led to violent acts symbolizing a lack of involvement from an 
absent parental figure (Steinkoler, 2017). Firearms in family life are often present with 
perpetrating individuals before a shooting. Many of these perpetrators have regularly gone to 
shooting ranges with family and have gone on hunting trips (Steinkoler, 2017). From this, it is 
witnessed that 77% of incidents in K-12 schools were led by perpetrators owning, using, training 
with, or practicing with firearms (NTAC, 2019). This familiarity with firearms has often helped 
with individuals to acquire weapons for their acts of violence. The US Secret Service points out 
that 76% of perpetrators retrieved firearms from the home of their parent or close relative, with 
almost half of the cases involving readily accessible firearms at home (NTAC, 2019). With 
firearms comes the next stages of characterizing the perpetrator, planning and motives, described 
next. 
Planning and Motives 
Premeditated, or planned, attacks are among the most common types of active shootings 
at educational facilities. Studies offer differing statistics with how often planning behaviors are 
noticed. The Secret Services states that 51% were observed to have planning in place before the 
attack (NTAC, 2019). Another study claims that 75% of perpetrators premeditated the attack, 
highlighting the trend of long thought into these events (Gerard et al., 2016). According to the 
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FBI, the median time spent preparing for attacks is 1-2 months, at 26%, with ranges between 24 
hours and 24 months (Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018). With planning, motives are brought into 
this discussion as to why a premeditated attack is being formulated. 95% of K-12 incidents 
involved at least one motive, with 85% holding a secondary motive as well (NTAC, 2019). Many 
of these motives are based on grievances, or “a perception… of having been wronged or treated 
unfairly or inappropriately” (Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018, pg. 21). Between 79-83% of 
recorded motives in these shootings have involved a grievance of some sort (NTAC, 2019; 
Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018). These grievances have often been caused by a precipitating 
event, triggering the shooting by the perpetrator (Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018; Gerard et al., 
2016). The leading grievances observed in educational facility events include peers, staff, and 
romantic issues, at 63%, 24%, and 22% respectfully (NTAC, 2019). Motives separate from 
grievances include suicide with 41% and desires to kill at 37% (NTAC, 2019). Another 
significant statistic involves people close with the perpetrator or bystanders. Gerard et al. 
describes that in 93% of cases, people knew about at least some aspects of the planned attacks on 
schools before the event (2016). Planning and motives are often products of behavioral issues, 
which is observed in the following section. 
Behavioral Issues 
Behavior problems are very prevalent in characterizing an active shooter in schools. 
These behavior problems entail policy violations, bullying, small acts of violence, and the 
planning of larger scale events (Flores de Apodaca et al., 2012). Disciplinary action for poor 
behavior is often witnessed before a shooting, also considered a precipitating event as discussed 
previously. Several categories of discipline are coupled with perpetrators before incidents, 
including fighting, classroom conduct, threats, academic integrity, and illegal substances (NTAC, 
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2019). It was discovered that of the 41 instances between 2008-2017, 71% of individuals had 
received disciplinary action for these listed behavioral issues (NTAC, 2019). The Secret Service 
outlines 10 different approaches to discipline for these cases, which are suspension, parental 
contact, conversations with staff, criminal charges or arrests, referrals for evaluation or 
assessment, formal documentation, detention, classroom consequences, expulsion, and other 
consequences not related to other approaches (2019). Behavioral issues often coincide with 
mental illness, seen below. 
Mental Health 
The last characteristic to be discussed, and possibly of the most importance, is mental 
health. Almost all individuals who performed acts of violence against school facilities displayed 
issues with their mental state, with a rate of 91% (NTAC, 2019). Depression and suicidal 
ideation are among the two most prevalent forms of mental illness observed in these cases 
(NTAC, 2019; Gerard et al., 2016; Steinkoler, 2017). History of depression was found in three 
separate studies, with a range between 61-63% (NTAC, 2019; Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018; 
Gerard et al., 2016). In addition, studies have indicated that suicidal ideation was observed in 60-
78% of perpetrating individuals (NTAC, 2019; Gerard et al., 2016). Suicidal ideation includes 
attempted suicide or noticeable suicidal thoughts before the attacks (Gerard et al., 2016). Other 
instances of mental health issues most observed with perpetrators is anxiety, paranoia, anger 
management problems, and psychotic episodes (NTAC, 2019; Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018). 
This high rate of mental illness in attackers may suggest that not enough is being done to help 
these individuals. 
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Suggestions for a Safer Learning Environment 
Understanding the characteristics of active shooters is important in applying what is 
known with what must be done to mitigate acts of violence against educational facilities. Several 
past case and research studies have been performed with these characterizations in mind to help 
curb these incidents. While traditional methods are still prevalent in protecting individuals in 
educational environments, much is being researched and suggested to proactively end school 
shootings and subsequent violence. Among the most prevalent methods of promoting a safer 
learning environment, physical and human measures along with threat assessments the way in 
most recent suggestions to make schools safe. Physical upgrades will be the first suggestion 
discussed in the next section. 
Physical Measures: School Resource Officers 
Physical upgrades in educational facilities are the most noticeable and obvious attempts 
at school security. These include both human-based and technological implementations to harden 
the school as a target for an active shooter. School resource officers (SRO) or other armed police 
officers have been a more traditional response implementation to school shootings (Jonson, 
2017). These individuals are defined as “a commissioned law enforcement officer who is 
specially trained to work within a school community to prevent and respond to unlawful 
behavior, including disorderly or violent acts” (Massachusetts Task Force, 2014, pg. 3). About 
half of the incidents studied by the Secret Service in K-12 schools involved the use of an SRO 
(NTAC, 2019). The United States Department of Justice, through 2017, had granted $745 million 
to help train and implement SROs in public schools (Jonson, 2017).  
With the implementation of SROs, it has been observed that schools have been more 
thoroughly patrolled, have formalized responses to crime reports from students and school 
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personnel, have implemented an emergency response plan, and have implemented risk 
assessments (Jonson, 2017). In addition, it has been observed that a positive relationship with an 
SRO can lead to better reporting of violent acts and an enhanced feeling of safety while at school 
(Jonson, 2017). It is not a surprise, then, that numerous research studies, joint task forces, after 
action reports, and government agencies advocate for the implementation of an SRO in 
educational facilities. Roles for these SROs should include three target areas: educator, informal 
counselor, and law enforcement officer (Massachusetts Task Force, 2014). When an SRO is not 
available, other physical measures can be taken, discussed in the next section. 
Physical Measures: Access Control 
 While SROs are effective physical measures, allocating the funds to sustain one can be of 
trouble in schools. With this, other methods of hardened security often include access control. 
Access control refers to door locks, visitor screening and sign-ins, implementing identification 
badges, and other standard security features (Jonson, 2017). As a result of this being more cost 
efficient, access control is “the most common response to school shootings” (Jonson, 2017, pg. 
963). Jonson’s findings indicate that 96% of schools have access control measures in place, with 
over 90% of schools employing the locking of doors and monitoring of all access points to the 
facilities (2017). As such, numerous sources advocate for the locking of all access points to the 
building. The Massachusetts Task Force Report on School Safety and Security states that there 
should only be one main monitored entrance that visitors can enter through, with the rest of 
access points locked down (2014). In addition, this report expands access control to suggesting 
door locks without the use of keys for educators and the implementation of name badges 
(Massachusetts Task Force, 2014). One more suggestion involving this form of access control is 
to regularly assess door locking mechanisms to ensure their proper working order (Massachusetts 
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Task Force, 2014). The combination of ease of implementation with effectiveness allows this 
form of security to be suggested through multiple sources. In addition to these implementations, 
another physical measure is offered below, metal detectors. 
Physical Measures: Metal Detectors 
 Metal detectors are another form of visible, physical measures to ensure school safety. 
These detectors are meant to “prevent the admittance of weapons, particularly guns, into the 
school” (Jonson, 2017, pg. 964). Studies have shown that metal detectors are at least somewhat 
or very effective and can possibly lead to the deterrence of students bringing firearms to school 
facilities (Jonson, 2017). While suggested to be a method to create a safer learning environment, 
these detectors are often cost prohibitive and may instill a sense of fear among students (Jonson, 
2017). The implementation of this physical measure should, therefore, be implemented only in 
the most severe cases of repetitive school violence. With physical upgrades discussed, it is now 
important to go over what people can do for protection, starting with lockdowns. 
Lockdowns 
 Additional security measures that include protecting the individual involve protective 
action. These protective action measures include traditional lockdowns, shelter in place, and 
more recently, proactive multi-option responses. Lockdowns are intended to protect individuals 
when “weapon related violence is in progress or imminent” and is intended to “place barriers 
between the building occupants and assailant(s)” (Massachusetts Task Force, 2014, pg. 16). 
Lockdowns were used in 68% of K-12 schools studied by the Secret Service (NTAC, 2019). 
Many federal, state, and school officials recommend the use of lockdowns as an initial measure 
to protect lives during an active shooting (Massachusetts Task Force, 2014; Jonson, 2014). While 
recommended, sometimes it is hard to implement a full lockdown of an educational facility. This 
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is because there are often times when shootings occur when students are not in securable 
locations, such as hallways and cafeterias (Jonson, 2017). Knowing this, there are additional 
protective measures suggested by authorities about school safety, such as shelter in place and 
multi-option responses. 
Sheltering in Place and Multi-Option Reponses 
 Shelter in place, also called reverse evacuation, is intended to be refuge for individuals in 
schools during an active threat when leaving the premises is more dangerous (Massachusetts 
Task Force, 2014). This method involves locking all exterior access points to the building and 
stops the movement of people for protection (Massachusetts Task Force, 2014). Shelter in place 
is advocated in many realms of school safety and security and is an extension of lockdown drills. 
When lockdowns and shelter in place measures fail, multi-option responses are suggested for 
use. These protective actions involve three core concepts: leaving the scene of the incident, 
locking down the facility and using barricades, and actively resisting the perpetrator (Jonson, 
2017). Several forms of multi-option responses exist, including the United States Department of 
Homeland Security’s Run, Hide, Fight; Texas State Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response 
Training (ALEERT) program’s Avoid, Deny, Defend, and the A.L.i.C.E. Training Institute’s 
Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter, and Evacuate (A.L.i.C.E Training Institute, 2014; ALEERT 
Center, 2004; DHS, 2020). These responses go in order of what should be attempted. Leaving the 
scene should be the first protective action taken and is advocated for by each of the preceding 
agencies or institutes (Jonson, 2017). If not an available option, locking down and using 
barricades should be next to prevent the perpetrator from gaining access to the room (Jonson, 
2017). The last option, resisting the perpetrator, should only happen if the first two responses 
have been exhausted (Jonson, 2017). As research continues into mitigating against the active 
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shooter, many trusted sources advocate and suggest the implementation of multi-option 
responses for protection. Understanding the physical suggestions for safety, an extremely 
important tool to mitigate and prevent school shootings, threat assessments, is reviewed in the 
following section. 
Characteristics of a Threat 
 Almost all research and organizations involved in the study of school active shootings 
arrive on one sound approach to prevent these violent acts: threat assessments. In understanding 
what a threat assessment is, the nature of the word “threat” must be understood. The FBI 
Academy’s National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) defines a threat as “A 
threat is an expression of intent to do harm or act out violently against someone or something. A 
threat can be spoken, written, or symbolic” (O’Toole, 2000, pg. 6). Threats fall into four 
categories: direct, indirect, veiled, or conditional (O’Toole, 2000). In addition, there are three 
levels of concern that the FBI introduced in 2000 and still uses: low, medium, and high (BTAC, 
2017; O’Toole, 2000). These characteristics of threats are the basis of what constitutes the threat 
assessment, outlined below. 
The Threat Assessment 
 Threat assessments tie together the threats, behaviors, and indicators of potential active 
shooters and provide a model to help in prevention of these incidents. The FBI’s Behavioral 
Analysis Unit (BAU) defines what a threat assessment is: 
Threat assessment is a systematic, fact-based method of investigation and examination 
that blends the collection and analysis of multiple sources of information with published 
research and practitioner experience, focusing on an individual’s patterns of thinking and 
behavior to determine whether, and to what extent, a person of concern is moving toward 
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an attack. A threat assessment is not a final product, but the beginning of the management 
process. It guides a course of action to mitigate a threat of potential violence. (BTAC, 
2017) 
These assessments are vital in the prevention of target school violence and must follow four 
essential elements in order to be effective. These elements are as follows: “establish authority 
and leadership to conduct an inquiry; develop a multidisciplinary threat assessment team that is 
based in the school or district and provide ongoing training; establish integrated and interagency 
systems relationships and partnerships to respond to public safety concerns; and provide 
awareness training for staff, students, parents, and community partners in warning signs of 
violence and reporting procedures” (CSSRC, 2018, pg. 3). The nature of threat assessments, 
therefore, must have structure, described below. 
Threat Assessment Cycle 
 When implementing what is known about threat characteristics, the levels of threat, and 
what must be included for an effective assessment, the threat assessment cycle is formed to put 
the research into practice. Figure 2 below, produced by the Colorado School Safety Resource 
Center (CSSRC) accurately describes how a threat should be analyzed and the proper steps to 
follow. This diagram shows the proper procedures involved in performing a threat assessment. 
The first step in the threat assessment is the reporting of the threat through the school, a call 
center line, such as Safe2Tell in Colorado, and to law enforcement. After the report is made on 
the threat, an assessment team assembles to vet the accuracy of the report. Three levels of threats, 
low, medium, and high concern, divide the danger of the threat to determine the actions 
necessary to take. Low concern involves constant monitoring of the situation and thorough 
documentation. Medium concern involves the development of an action plan, continued 
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monitoring of the threat, and the inclusion of other disciplines. High concern involves law 
enforcement investigations, re-entry evaluations of the individual, and continual monitoring. 
Once this is completed and the threat is stabilized, the action plan must be followed along with 
documenting all steps taken to support the student and monitoring must continue as an ongoing 
plan. In properly following these steps, a threat assessment can significantly improve the safety 
of educational facility occupants. As noted above, including other disciplines improves the 
efficacy of the assessment, and should lead to the formation of a multidisciplinary threat 
assessment team. 
Figure 2 
(CSSRC, 2018) 
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Multidisciplinary Threat Assessment Teams 
 Threat assessment teams should encompass personnel from multiple corresponding 
organizations and agencies. The CSSRC states the multidisciplinary team should include a senior 
administration member, school disciplinary or safety personnel, mental health professionals, 
local law enforcement, and other areas including guidance counselors, teachers, coaches, nurses, 
and other figures essential in school societies (2018). These are essential for an effective team to 
foster collaboration, coordination, and communication among the varying authorities that may 
receive an alert to a potential threat (FBI, 2013). As seen in the preceding sections, threat 
assessment is very involving and requires resources and effort from many areas of expertise. The 
effective nature of this tool and the stakeholders it encompasses leads to its recommendation 
from all levels of government, school administrators, and researchers. 
Methodology 
The methodology of this research answered the following research question: how can 
policies and response procedures be improved to mitigate against future incidents in American 
schools? It was completed through the qualitative process of case study threat assessment review 
found in school shooting after-action reports. The case study review entailed reading after-action 
reports from previous incidents, filtering information regarding threat assessments, and focusing 
on issues from each assessment to determine their failures. This method was chosen for its use of 
data availability and reliability from government and nonprofit sources. To answer the research 
question, a matrix was developed to collect information regarding indicators, use of threat 
assessments, and the failures of the threat assessments. Below are the questions the matrix is 
based on: 
• What indicators were identified before the incident? 
• Was a threat assessment, or similar tool, used in response to these indicators? 
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• If so, what areas of the performed threat assessment failed? 
These questions were formed through the analysis of past studies and research articles relating to 
individual characteristics, behaviors, and suggested strategies and implementations to create a 
safer learning environment. Additionally, the matrix categories were conceived to determine why 
threat assessments are highly recommended among practitioners and academics yet still fail in 
certain incidents. The intended outcome of this methodology was to highlight what 
characteristics are commonly noticed before an incident, what areas of the threat assessment 
failed, and how corrections to these assessments can create an effective measure to mitigate 
against future active shootings in American schools. 
To best implement what is known about active shooters, their characteristics and 
behaviors, and the suggestions provided to increase safety in the classroom, the study of three 
specific incidents was completed. The choice of reviewing three incidents was determined to 
improve the reliability of the findings in the after-action reports. Characteristics and outcomes 
are better supported through the inclusion of multiple reports and limits research bias. Cases 
reviewed included reports that had established uses of threat assessments or similar measures to 
deter violence. The purpose of using these reports compared to other available reports is their 
abundance of information about threat assessments, the focus of this research project. In doing 
this, a thorough analysis of educational facility use of threat assessments was completed and is 
applied to correcting the shortfalls of the mitigative measure. 
This study reviewed the cases of Arapahoe High School, Columbine High School, and 
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. Arapahoe High School is part of the Littleton Public 
Schools in Littleton, Colorado (Safe Havens International, 2016). The incident occurred on 
December 13, 2013 when Karl Pierson entered the premises, shot and killed one student, and 
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then proceeded to commit suicide (Woodward & Goodrum, 2016). A thorough review of the 
threat assessment used on Pierson is found in the two after-action reports produced. Columbine 
High School, also located in Colorado, experienced an active shooting led by two individuals, 
Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris (Columbine Review Commission, 2001). This incident ended 
after 47 minutes with 13 students and faculty dead and the suicides of both Klebold and Harris 
(Columbine Review Commission, 2001). As found in the other report, assessment measures were 
performed on both individuals prior to the shooting. The active shooting at Marjory Stoneman 
Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida was carried out by Nikolas Cruz on February 14, 2018 
(MSDPSC, 2019). In the aftermath of this incident, 17 individuals were killed and an additional 
17 wounded (MSDPSC, 2019). A threat assessment was performed on Cruz as in both other 
incidents at Arapahoe and Columbine High Schools. The following table, designated Figure 3, 
highlights what was found when reviewing the after-action reports of these three incidents. 
Figure 3 
Shooting 
Incident 
What Indicators Were 
Identified Before? 
Was a form 
of Threat 
Assessment 
Used? 
What Areas of Threat 
Assessment Failed? 
Arapahoe 
High School 
- Individual threatened to kill 
librarian 
- Individual threatened to kill 
middle school student 
- Individual had established 
anger management issues 
- Individual passed around 
pictures of purchased gun 
- Violent acts and statements 
against school staff 
- Demotion and ostracization 
from social clubs and groups 
Yes - There was not an integrated 
approach between administration 
and public safety partners 
- Lack of adhering to established 
policy in threat assessment process 
- Lack of multidisciplinary 
assessment team or point of contact 
- Many did not know how to report 
indicators to assessment team or 
Safe2Tell hotline 
- Mental health professionals were 
deceived by individual, preventing 
thorough assessment 
Columbine 
High School 
- Suicidal thoughts and mental 
illness 
- Social ostracization 
Yes - Information sharing between 
authorities was not allowed under 
law at the time 
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- Other’s knowledge of the 
acquisition of guns and making 
of bombs 
- Threats established on 
videotapes and a created 
webpage by individuals 
- Established history with 
juvenile justice system 
- Acts of violence against 
students prior to incident 
- Bullying and victimization by 
other students 
- Authorities unaware of activities 
because of lack of integrated 
approach 
- Students did not report indicators 
to administration or law 
enforcement for fear of 
repercussions 
- There was not a multidisciplinary 
team established to address threats 
Marjory 
Stoneman 
Douglas High 
School 
- Adoption and foster home 
past 
- 69 incidences when 
individual referred to violent 
acts or ideologies 
- Long history displaying 
violent behavior 
- Extensive mental health 
treatment; depression and 
suicidal thoughts 
- Recorded incidences of racist 
or prejudiced ideologies 
- Individual killed small 
animals, not considered 
hunting 
- Unreported bullying and 
ostracization by peers 
Yes - Authorities in charge of threat 
assessment misunderstood or did 
not know assessment process 
- Reporting procedures for a threat 
assessment were not followed 
- Administrators were not trained 
on how to conduct a thorough 
threat assessment 
- Process was decentralized, 
reactive, and was not supervised by 
the school district administrators 
- Lack of oversight and 
accountability of those involved 
 
Results 
 In reviewing the three specific shooting incidents at Arapahoe High School, Columbine 
High School, and Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, there were many instances where 
indicators were observed. Each case had established characteristics as highlighted in previous 
studies and reports. The Arapahoe High School individual issued several violent verbal and 
physical acts against people within the school and other schools in the same district. In addition, 
this individual faced peer ostracization and isolation in the weeks leading to the event. When 
reviewing the individuals from the Columbine High School incident, there were also several 
identified characteristics that have been previously established. Among these, mental illness, 
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suicidal thoughts, social ostracization and bullying, and verbal and physical threats were the 
most prevalent precursors. In the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School event, the individual 
had several recorded violence-related incidents with his family, peers, and school faculty. In 
addition, instances of mental illness and depression, racist and prejudiced ideologies, bullying 
and ostracization, and a history of an unstable homelife were observed. In each case, these 
precursors led to a threat assessment. 
 Analyzing these threat assessments performed before the shootings occurred highlights 
deficiencies in this strategy. In each of the three cases, the established protocols and procedures 
for threat assessments were fully not followed. At Arapahoe High School, several issues were 
noticed with the threat assessment. The most significant deficiency was the lack of integrating 
school administration, mental health providers, and law enforcement. Other issues observed were 
the lack of a central point of contact to oversee the threat assessment, poor communication to 
students and faculty about how to report disturbing behavior, and the inability of professionals to 
properly diagnose the individual prior to the incident. The Columbine High School shooting’s 
assessment of the two individuals also had deficiencies. A significant factor in this event was 
legislation preventing information sharing between law enforcement and school officials. 
Additional issues observed include a lack of integration in the school threat assessment and 
students afraid to report troubling behaviors of the perpetrators for fear of discipline. Marjory 
Stoneman Douglas High School’s shooting showed similar issues with threat assessment. 
Multiple school authorities were unknowledgeable in the threat assessment process and intended 
outcomes. In addition, reporting procedures were not followed, administrative personnel were 
not trained to perform assessments, and the process was not integrated with a lack of oversight 
on following through with disciplinary action. After reviewing the three shootings, it can be 
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determined that numerous indicators were observed before the incidents, but a deficiency in 
identifying indicators, performing the assessment, and acting on the threats led to the shootings. 
Discussion 
 While threat assessments are observed to be effective in preventing multiple forms of 
school violence, they must be performed cohesively and as designed. In each of the three cases 
reviewed, a lack of cohesion among student and faculty reporting, administrative leadership, and 
the lack of information sharing between school administration and law enforcement were the 
most common issues. These issues could have been avoided had proper procedures been 
followed by those involved in the threat assessments. In each case, several indicators of violent 
behavior found in active shooters was observed, but never fully addressed by threat assessment 
teams. One issue with these indicators was the reporting procedures in place for students and 
faculty. Students were not likely to report on fellow students and faculty were not sure when to 
report. In addition, a large failure among school officials was to properly train those on 
assessment teams on how to effectively perform their roles. This failure led to the lack of 
integration, which failed both the school administration and respective law enforcement agencies 
in the school districts. These shortfalls highlight the improper adherence to threat assessments 
and their intended outcomes. 
 Threat assessments, although failure-prone under certain circumstances, are still essential 
in preventing and deterring school violence. When followed properly, violent behavior and 
threats issued by individuals can be effectively handled to create a safer learning environment. 
Through the implementation of action plans by the multidisciplinary team, the assessed 
individual can be removed from school facilities, behavioral and mental assistance can be 
offered, and a reintegration plan established. Including all disciplines in this plan, especially law 
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enforcement, helps to ensure the individual does not continue to be of harm to his or herself and 
those in educational facilities. Even with the observed shortfalls in the reviewed cases, threat 
assessments remain an overall effective tool in preventing active shootings in schools. 
 To correct the deficiencies in threat assessments, the most significant recommendation is 
to improve training and educational opportunities to those on assessment teams. In each case, a 
lack of understanding in the true threat assessment process hindered its effectiveness. By offering 
more thorough and available training to school staff, administration, health providers, and law 
enforcement, roles can be more clearly identified, defined, and performed. Another 
recommendation to improve the process is to encourage students and faculty to report violent 
behavior and indicators to either administration, law enforcement, or a hotline. As observed in 
the cases reviewed, students were afraid to speak out in fear of punishment and some staff were 
unaware of reporting procedures already established. Improving the communication to students 
and faculty about reporting options and how these options improve the safety of the learning 
environment should be done through educational opportunities and outreach programs. These 
recommendations serve to help repair threat assessment processes to make the tool better suited 
for addressing violent behavior. 
 While much of the recommendations focus on the threat assessment process, it is still 
important to understand the role of indicators in the threat assessment. These assessments are 
only effective when the school community can identify these indicators in an individual and 
realize these characteristics can lead to violent acts. Those in the community should be informed 
of such indicators, especially on the topics of mental health, behavioral issues, social integration 
problems, and peer-related bullying, teasing, and ostracization. When these indicators are 
reported to the appropriate school administration or law enforcement, the threat assessment 
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process can be initiated and performed to prevent instances of school violence and active 
shootings. The school community’s knowledge of what constitutes as indicating characteristics 
and behavior is essential to the effective threat assessment process. 
 The multidisciplinary threat assessment is a great tool to combat potential school violence 
when performed correctly. With that, there are other measures that can mitigate against violence 
in educational facilities. As discussed previously, there are several hardening procedures that can 
be implemented to prevent an active shooter from accessing the facility. These may be more 
reactive than proactive mitigative measures but are effective during an incident. Combining these 
hardening measures with the use of threat assessment can significantly increase the safety of the 
inhabitants of the school facility. An additional strategy is to better involve the parents in the 
safety measures taken at schools. Parents may observe behaviors or characteristics in their 
children that school staff, administration, and law enforcement do not see. By preventing the 
violent behavior from entering the school grounds, the parents can be the first step in the 
mitigative process in securing the safety of students and staff at school. 
 There are limitations observed in researching school violence and active shootings. One 
issue encountered is the definition of an active shooter and what constitutes as an individual 
involved. This report used the definition agreed upon by several federal agencies, including the 
U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Several other 
definitions exist in both the practicing and academic disciplines, as there is not just one effective, 
overarching definition of an active shooter. These individuals have common characteristics and 
behavior, but all differ in what characteristics are observed, what their planning methods are, 
where they attack, how they attack, why they attack, and the number of casualties. For these 
reasons, there is significant debate on defining these individuals, which is reflected throughout 
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this report. In addition, locating information for some areas of school violence and shootings is 
difficult. School violence, and more specifically the instances of shootings, is a sore spot among 
many involved in the school community. There is hesitation among family of the perpetrating 
individuals to provide research data after incidents; school staff and administration are hesitant to 
provide issues within their organization that may have led to the violence; and interviewing after 
the incident can cause emotional issues. Locating information on how threat assessments failed 
was limited by such hesitation to provide organizational issues. 
 Further research should be performed using the information provided in this report. 
Researching how to better prepare individuals to participate in information sharing in school 
communities should be completed. Information sharing was a failing point in the analyzed cases 
and methods for better communication researched. Additionally, researching methods to better 
equip the school community to report warning indicators, including behavior and mental health 
issues, should be performed. Ultimately, mitigative efforts centered around the threat assessment 
cannot be completed unless there is an effective reporting method implemented in educational 
facilities. This report lays the foundation for these research opportunities to be explored and new 
procedures developed to improve the mitigative efforts to increase school safety. 
Summary 
 The purpose of this report serves to understand what mitigative efforts can be used to 
prevent active shooters in educational facilities and create a safer learning environment in 
American schools. In doing so, it is important to understand the characteristics of perpetrating 
individuals involved with active shootings. These individuals are generally Caucasian males 
between the ages of 12 and 21 with histories of social integration issues, violent behavior, and 
mental health issues. There are issues observed within their family and there is often significant 
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planning behind an attack on an educational facility. Previous research has recommended 
mitigative efforts to prevent individuals from completing their attacks on schools. These include 
physical implementations, such as a school resource officer, access control, and metal detectors. 
Other measures include lockdowns, sheltering in place, and multi-optioned responses. Among 
the most recommended mitigative measures is threat assessment.  
Threat assessment works to respond to reports of troubled individuals, determining the 
credibility of the threat and its level of concern, and implementing an action plan to remove the 
individual, provide necessary interventions, and reintegrate the individual back into the 
educational facility. These mitigative assessments have numerous effective qualities, are the most 
promising strategy currently, and should be used in all schools. Threat assessments are not 
foolproof and have areas that may fail. Among these areas, a lack of communication, 
involvement of appropriate team members, and lack of training are the most observed issues in 
threat assessment processes. To correct these issues, there should be training available to those 
involved with threat assessment so that roles are better understood and performed when 
necessary. 
 Other mitigative efforts schools should incorporate into their facilities include the 
hardening of the building. When combined with the threat assessment, the safety and security of 
the school facilities and environment is significantly improved. Additionally, involving parents 
and informing them of their role in preventing behavioral issues before it reaches the education 
environment should be implemented. This report is essential in understanding how current 
mitigative efforts to create safe learning environments are effective, what can be done to improve 
these efforts, and what other strategies can be further researched. By correcting the issues found 
in threat assessments, this mitigative tool to deter and prevent violence in American schools 
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should increase the safety of all in the school community, help individuals most at risk of violent 
actions, and ensure a more secure learning environment for all students in America. 
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